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Recent Decisions
TENTH

AMENDMENT-INTERGOVERNMENTAL

NITY-FEDERAL TAXATION

TAX

IMMU-

OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL BOND INTER-

EST-The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal
government may tax the interest from state and municipal bonds.
South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988).
The United States Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)l to achieve four main goals. 2
These objectives were to increase revenue and reduce the large
budget deficit, to spread the tax burden fairly, to decrease the economic distortions due to the tax laws, and to have those who use
government services pay for them. 3 To combat the growing unfairness of the tax burden and the burgeoning tax evasion problem,
TEFRA contained provisions to improve the withholding and information reporting systems.4 One such provision was section
310(b)(1),' which removed the federal income tax exemption for
1. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 595 (1982).
2. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1982).
3. Id. at 96. This casenote will focus on the tax equity goal of TEFRA.
4. Id. at 97-98.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, 26 U.S.C. § 103(j)(1)(1982) reads as follows:
(b) OTHER OBLIGATIONS.(1) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAX-EXEMPT.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain governmental obligations) is
amended by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (k) and by inserting after subsection (i) the following new subsection:
() OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAX-EXEMPT.(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in subsection (a) or in other provision of law shall be
construed to provide an exemption from Federal income tax for interest on any registration required obligation unless the obligation is in registered form.
(2) REGISTRATION-REQUIRED OBLIGATION.-The term 'registration-required
obligation' means any obligation other than an obligation which(A) is not of a type offered to the public,
(B) has a maturity (at issue) of not more than 1 year, or
(C) is described in section 163(f)(2)(B).
(3) SPECIAL RULES.(A) BOOK ENTRIES PERMITTED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a book entry
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interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state
and local governments,' unless these bonds were issued in registered form.7
South Carolina brought an action in the United States Supreme
Court against the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States
seeking injunctive and other relief from section 310(b)(1).1 With
the potential federal taxation of its bearer bonds, South Carolina
contended that section 310(b)(1) was constitutionally invalid under
the tenth amendment 9 and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity.' 0 The Court appointed a Special Master to develop the
shall be treated as in registered form if the right to the principal of, and stated interest on, such obligation may be transferred only through a book entry consistent with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(B) NOMINEES.-The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of paragraph (1) where there is a nominee or chain of
nominees.

Id.
6. The municipal bond marketplace was a diverse market with approximately 47,000
issuers ranging from large state and public agencies to small school and sewer districts. The
market was also growing with $23 billion of new issues in 1974, which increased to $102
billion in 1984. Large issues of $10 million or more dominated the dollar volume of the
market in 1983 by accounting for eighty-three percent of the market, while from a numbers
perspective, issues of less than $10 million accounted for seventy-six percent of the market.
Report of Special Master at 20-21, South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) [hereinafter Report of Special Master].
The proceeds from the issuance of the municipal bonds were used for a multitude of
purposes. In 1984, approximately $27 billion from general obligation bonds was spent on
buildings and maintaining roads, bridges, jails, schools, and municipal buildings. Also in
1984, $74 billion from municipal revenue bonds was used for numerous functions such as
water and sewage, hospitals, public power, pollution abatement, public housing, mortgage
subsidies, and student loans. Exceptions of the National Governors' Association (NGA) to
the Report of the Special Master and Brief in Support Thereof at 6, South Carolina v.
Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) [hereinafter Brief for the NGA].
7. Bonds are of two types. They are issued in either registered or bearer form with
ownership and how interest is paid distinguishing between the two types. The owner of a
registered bond is recorded on the corporation's books and when the bond is sold, the old
bond certificate is cancelled and a new certificate issued to the buyer. Interest is paid to the
owner of record. Alternatively, bonds may be issued in bearer or coupon form. Possession
establishes ownership and interest is paid to the person who presents a bond coupon to a
bank. H. SIMONs revised by J. SMITH & K. SKOUSEN, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 401 (6th ed.

1977).
8.

South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984). The complaint was initially filed in

the United States Supreme Court under art. III § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution,
which grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases in which a State is a party. Id.
at 370 n.1.
9. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
10. Regan, 465 U.S. at 370. South Carolina was granted leave to file the complaint at
issue against the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Donald T. Regan. Id. The
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record,11 and after discovery and three weeks of proceedings,"2 the
Special Master reached findings of fact, performed legal analysis,
and drew conclusions of law. 3 One of the more significant of the
Master's findings was that section 310(b)(1) forced the states to
issue bonds in registered, rather than bearer, form.' The Master
also determined that registration appeared to have no influence on
the states' ability to borrow or on the states' preference for issuing
bonds in registered rather than bearer form.'"
Upon examining the burdens on the states in order to comply
with section 310(b)(1), 6 the Master determined that the legislative
and administrative expenditures were not dissimilar to those ordinarily required of state governments, and that these expenditures
did not hamper the states from performing their governmental
functions.17 Second, no significant difference was found between
the original issuance costs of registered versus bearer bonds.' 8
Third, the Master discovered no interest rate differential between
bearer and registered bonds.' 9 Next, the Master responded to the
charge that the costs of section 310(b)(1) resulted in "a diminution
in the sovereign status of the States. ' 20 Although acknowledging
plurality opinion declared that "[u]nquestionably, the manner in which a State may exercise
its borrowing power is a question that is of vital importance to all 50 States." Id. at 382. The
Honorable Samuel J. Roberts was appointed as Special Master to develop the record. South
Carolina v. Regan, 466 U.S. 948 (1984). The NGA filed a motion to intervene. The Court
referred the motion to the Special Master, South Carolina v. Regan, 468 U.S. 1226 (1984),
who recommended the granting of the motion. See Report of Special Master on Motion of
National Governors' Association for Leave to Intervene as Plaintiff (November 16, 1984).
After the Special Master issued his report, South Carolina and the NGA filed factual and
legal exceptions to the Special Master's Report naming James T. Baker, III, the then Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, as defendant. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct.
1355, 1360, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 2837 (1988). This casenote examines the Baker case.
11. Regan, 465 U.S. at 382.
12. Report of Special Master at 4.
13. See Report of Special Master. The Master's report and recommendations were
purely advisory with the Court ultimately to decide the merits of the case. Report of Special
Master at 6.
14. Report of Special Master at 23, referring to the Stipulation at paragraph 6.
"States," as used in the opinion and this casenote, will refer to both state and local
governments.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 34-88.
17. Id. at 36.
18. Id. at 41. Examples of original issuance costs were printing costs, bond counsel
fees, financial advisory costs, and bond rating costs. Id.
19. Id. at 45. While South Carolina argued that investors prefer bearer bonds over
registered bonds and would therefore demand a higher interest rate on registered bonds, the
Master did not accept the reports used by South Carolina in support of its argument. Id.
20. Id. at 77.
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that the type of debt to issue was a practical consideration determined by the market, the Master could find no impact by TEFRA
on the states' ability to borrow funds, or on their fiscal condition in
general, other than changing the form of the debt.2"
In analyzing the benefits that flowed to the federal government,
the Master reasoned that the concerns of the federal government
regarding bearer municipal bonds were real, and the approach
taken by Congress to remedy these ills was appropriate.2 2 Acknowledging that there was no evidence in the record tying bearer municipal bonds to tax evasion and income concealment, the Master
nevertheless observed that:
[T]he fundamental attributes of bearer bonds are enormously helpful to individuals desiring to evade the tax laws and to conceal unreported income.
Bearer bonds are convenient to transport and hide, are easily negotiable at
published prices, involve anonymity and minimum reporting requirements,
and are capable of supporting substantial amounts of cash. Moreover,
bearer municipal bonds - unlike cash substitutes - earn interest, and taxexempt interest at that.2

Therefore, the Master concluded that "[g]iven the inherent characteristics of bearer bonds, Congress' conclusions that they facilitate
tax avoidance and income concealment seem altogether
reasonable."2"
After engaging in extensive legal analysis, the Master proceeded
to his legal conclusions.2 5 First, the Master found that whether registered or bearer bonds were issued is solely a technical borrowing
exercise. 26 Second, the Master addressed the burdens imposed by
the registration requirement of section 310(b)(1) and decided that
such burdens did not weigh heavily upon the states. 2 Third, South
Carolina's charge that investor preference for bearer bonds forced
the interest rate on registered bonds to increase five to fifteen basis
points was rejected by the Master.2 8 Fourth, the Master reasoned
21. Id. at 77-78.
22. Id. at 84. The problems associated with bearer municipal bonds were estate and
gift tax evasion, capital gains tax evasion, and concealment of legal and illegal income. Id.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.

25. Id. at 191-93. The Master's legal analysis will not be examined in detail here as
this casenote contains a history section which relies on the Master's analysis. See infra notes

144-260 and accompanying text.
26. Report of Special Master at 191. The Master noted that the municipal bond market readily accepted registered bonds. Id.
27. Id. The resulting legislative and administrative burdens "were neither qualitatively nor quantitatively extraordinary." Id.
28. Id. at 192. One basis point equals .01 percent. The Master pointed out that even if

1989

Recent Decision

that the concept of federalism was neither violated by the registration requirement of section 310(b)(1), 29 nor was judicial review
necessary as section 310(b)(1) had a limited impact on the states.
Furthermore, Congress had consulted the states in implementing
the registration requirement."0 Finally, the Master determined that
section 310(b)(1) survived intergovernmental tax immunity concerns."' As Congress had the power to regulate the states, the
Master concluded that the sanctions for failing to issue registered
bonds were not "ar impermissible regulatory tax."32 Therefore, a
recommendation was made for entering judgment for the Secretary
33
of the Treasury.
South Carolina and the National Governors' Association (NGA)
filed exceptions to various factual findings and legal conclusions of
the Special Master. " Specifically, South Carolina filed twentyeight exceptions to the Special Master's Report. 5 Among them,
South Carolina disputed the Master's finding that Congress was
duly informed that bearer bonds posed a tax compliance problem,
and that registering bonds was the appropriate solution to this
problem.3 6 Also challenged was the finding that the increased cost
there was a market preference for bearer bonds, the preference was likely due to one of the
reasons that Congress gave for requiring the registration of bonds. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. In testifying before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee concerning TEFRA, five of the approximately 15 state
and local officials spoke in opposition to registration. The then Governor of New York,
Hugh Carey, proclaimed that the costs of registration would result in unfair operational and
administrative burdens and there would be an interest rate increase of as much as onequarter to one-half a percentage point. Governor Bond of Missouri testified that in addition
to increasing issuance costs, registration of industrial revenue bonds would interfere with
the operation of state and local governments. Id. at 13-14 (referencing the Hearings before
the House Committee on Ways and Means Concerning the Administration's Fiscal Year
1983 Economic Program,H.R. REP. No. 97-404, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1110, 1322, 1324 (1982)
and the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance Concerning the Administration's Fiscal Year 1983 Budget Proposal,S. REP. No.__, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
31. Report of Special Master at 192. The Master observed that the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine did not unequivocally prevent federal taxation of municipal bond
interest. Id. The Master also decided that the minimal burdens under the section presented
no constitutional challenge. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Exceptions of the State of South Carolina to the Report of the Special Master and
Brief in Support Thereof at 8-16, South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct. 1355, reh'g denied, 108
S. Ct. 2837 (1988) [hereinafter Brief for South Carolina], and Brief for the NGA at i-iii.
35. Brief for South Carolina at 8-16.
36. Id. at 8-9. Assistant Treasury Secretary Chapoton, in testifying before the House
Ways and Means Committee in support of the registration requirement, offered no direct
proof that bearer bonds were used to avoid capital gains tax or that they were used to
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and burden of registration were not significant enough to affect local governments.3 7 Additionally, South Carolina took exception to
the Master's findings that no interest rate differential existed between bearer and registered bonds, that Congress' conclusions
"seem altogether reasonable" that bearer bonds facilitated tax
avoidance and income concealment,3 8 and that the registration requirement was non-discriminatory. 9
South Carolina also listed exceptions to the Special Master's legal conclusions.4 ° South Carolina disagreed that the tax sanction of
registration did not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity, the tenth amendment, and the concept of federalism.
In addition, the Master's legal conclusions that the tax sanction
did not burden the states' borrowing power and did not violate the
states' political power were disputed by South Carolina.' 2 These
conflicts between South Carolina and the Special Master formed
the political process tenth amendment issue and the intergovernmental tax immunity issue in South Carolina v. Baker.
conceal income. Id. at 102-03.
37. Id. at 10. South Carolina made several points in support of its argument that the
registration requirement added substantial costs and burdens to the issuance of state bonds.
The Government Finance Research Center study of bond issues of $10 million or less determined that registration significantly increased the continuing administrative costs and costs
of paying interest and principal. For South Carolina, average original issuance costs and
ongoing administrative costs went from $14.28 per $1,000 of principal for bearer bonds issued from 1979 through 1982 to $24.41 per $1,000 of principal for bearer bonds issued after
1982. Id. at 84-85. In addition, the Special Master noted that the time and money expended
by the states to meet the TEFRA requirements were "not insignificant." Report of Special
Master at 36.
38. Brief for South Carolina at 11. South Carolina relied upon a study by Herman B.
Leonard, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and Donald G. Puglisi,
Professor of Finance at the University of Delaware, entitled "Municipal Bond Administrative Costs." The study found a penalty for registered bonds over bearer bonds of 5 to 15
basis points. Id. at 87. South Carolina implied that the Special Master's conclusion was
without support as no quantitative evidence proved the connection between bearer bonds
and tax avoidance and income concealment. Id. at 102-03.
39. Id. at 14. As private issuers and the federal government had already issued registered bonds, South Carolina argued that only the states were effectively subject to §
310(b)(1). Id. at 57.
40. Id. at 14-16.
41. Id. at 14. South Carolina maintained that § 310(b)(1) unconstitutionally violated
the sovereignty of the states and precedent precluded a federal tax on state bond interest.
Id. at 108.
42. Id. at 16. South Carolina listed the numerous additional costs associated with registered bonds. A registrar and transfer agent had to be obtained, a record of bond holders
had to be maintained, and interest payments had to be prepared and mailed. Id. at 83. One
of the functions of independent states was to borrow money, which necessarily included the
power to chose the form of the debt. Section 310(b)(1) eliminated this right and dictated the
issuance of registered bonds according to South Carolina. Id. at 89-93.
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Two exceptions to the Special Master's Report were filed by the
NGA. 4 3 The NGA's one exception paralleled South Carolina's challenge to the Master's finding that there was no interest rate differential between registered and bearer bonds. 4 The NGA's other exception, not raised by South Carolina, was to the Special Master's
finding that section 310(b)(1) did not violate "affirmative limits"
upon Congress' regulatory authority under the tenth amendment."
Disagreeing with the Master's position "that the Constitution required examination of the weight rather than the nature of Congress' intrusion on the States' internal government imposed by
Section 310(b)(1)," 6 the NGA contended that the inquiry should
be whether Congress could command the states at all.4 7 This dispute with the Special Master created the "commandeering" tenth
amendment issue in South Carolina v. Baker.
Justice Brennan, in writing for the five justice majority, 48 analyzed the two major issues in the case. 4 9 The Supreme Court first
considered whether section 310(b)(1) forced the states to issue registered bonds, thereby violating the tenth amendment and the constitutional concept of federalism. 50 The second issued addressed
was whether section 310(b)(1) transgressed the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity by imposing a tax on the interest from
unregistered state bonds.5 1
South Carolina and the NGA argued that TEFRA effectively violated the tenth amendment and the concept of federalism because
43. Brief for the NGA at i-iii.
44. Id. at ii. This Exception was NGA's Exception No. 2. Id.
45. Id. This Exception was NGA's Exception No. 1. Id. The NGA instead contended
that § 310(b)(1) violated the "separate and independent existence" of the states by using
the states to advance federal interests, thereby overstepping the "affirmative limits" on
Congress' regulatory powers. Id. at 30-31.
46. Id. at ii.
47. Id. at 41. "[Tlhe Constitution forbids Congressional regulation of a kind that commandeers state deliberative and administrative processes." Id. at 43.
48. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1358. Joining Justice Brennan in the majority opinion were
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. Justice Scalia joined in the majority
opinion, except for Part II. Id. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1369. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurred in the judgment. Id. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1370. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case or the decision. Id. at 1369.
49. Id. at 1358.
50. Id. Justice Brennan used " 'the Tenth Amendment' to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in
the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution." Id. at 1360 n.4. This casenote will follow Justice Brennan's meaning of "the
Tenth Amendment."
51. Id. at 1358.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:355

the statute required states to issue registered bonds.32 The alternative was to issue unregistered bonds which would not be tax-exempt, and therefore, would have to compete against other taxable
bonds. 3 South Carolina and the NGA contended that this competition would force the states to increase the interest rates on their
bonds twenty-eight to thirty-five percent above the rate on taxexempt bonds.54 According to the Special Master, the practical effect of section 310(b)(1) was to eliminate the state's pre-TEFRA
freedom to issue bonds in bearer form, and to force the sovereign
states to issue registered bonds.5" Thus, South Carolina and the
NGA claimed that TEFRA violated the tenth amendment by denying the states the alternative of issuing nonexempt bearer
bonds. 56 Conceding that the section essentially compelled registration, the Secretary of the Treasury maintained that Congress could
prohibit the issuance of bearer bonds by the states without violat57
ing the tenth amendment.
In developing the tenth amendment issue, Justice Brennan accepted section 310(b)(1) as directly regulating the states by precluding the offering of bearer bonds.5 8 Justice Brennan noted that
under Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,5 9
states claiming a tenth amendment violation by Congress "must
find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of
unregulable state activity."60 South Carolina claimed that the political process failed because Congress had little concrete evidence
that unregistered state bonds contributed to federal income tax
evasion,6 1 and that the registration requirement was an ineffective
52. Id. at 1360.
53. Id.
54. Id. The 28-35% increase would be due to the loss of tax-exempt status with the
bonds becoming subject to federal income tax. Report of Special Master at 2.
55. Report of Special Master at 2, 23-24.
56. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360.
57. Id. See Brief for Secretary of the Treasury on the Report of the Special Master at
26, South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) [hereinafter Brief for Secretary of the
Treasury].
58. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360.
59. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia is a leading case on tenth amendment limits and Congress' authority to regulate state activities. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Garcia.
60. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360. In other words, Garcia stood for the proposition that the
tenth amendment limits on the Congress were "structural, not substantive." Id. (referencing
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537-54).
61. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360. Congress relied instead on anecdotal evidence that taxpayers were not reporting interest from state bearer bonds. Id.

Recent Decision

1989
remedy.62

Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Garcia Court realized
that some extraordinary shortcoming in the federal political system might violate the tenth amendment, but noted that South
Carolina did not argue that it was either excluded from the political scene or "that it was singled out in a way that left it politically
isolated and powerless."6 Instead, Justice Brennan perceived
South Carolina's position to be that the political process failed because, in enacting section 310(b)(1), Congress was uninformed and
relied on incomplete information." The majority opinion, however,
reasoned that neither Garcia nor the tenth amendment authorized
the courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional
legislation. 5 Justice Brennan then summarized the majority's response to South Carolina's argument by concluding that the national political process had not been jeopardized, and that the
tenth amendment was not violated.6
The second part of the tenth amendment issue was advanced by
the NGA.6 7 The NGA contended that section 310(b)(1) was invalid
as it "commandeered" state legislatures and forced them to not
only enact legislation requiring bond registration, but also to establish the necessary registration machinery.6 8 The NGA relied on
62. Id. South Carolina argued that the registration requirement was an ineffective
remedy because most sales were handled by brokers who must file information reports regardless of the form of the bond. Id. Also, beneficial ownership of registered bonds does not
have to be recorded. Id.
63. Id. at 1361. As the Garcia court chose not to elaborate on Congress' authority to
regulate state activities, Justice Brennan also declined to venture into this unexplored area.
Id. In addition, Justice Brennan cited United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), as a comparison. Id. In Carolene Products Co., Congress prohibited interstate shipment of "filled" milk which was defined as skimmed milk mixed with non-milk fat. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. at 145-46. The statute was challenged by Carolene Products Co. on
due process grounds. Id. at 146-47. The Court upheld the federal regulation by applying a
"minimum rationality" test. Id. at 154.
The existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless .. .it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.
Id. at 152.
64. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1361. See Brief for South Carolina at 101.
65. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1361.
66. Id. Only Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the
majority opinion's conclusion regarding South Carolina's tenth amendment argument. Justice Scalia excepted to this part of the majority opinion. See infra notes 107-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion.
67. Id. at 1361.
68.

Id.

364
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6
FERC v. Mississippi,
which acknowledged that the tenth amendment might set some limits on Congress' power to regulate the
states. 70 Justice Brennan, however, found FERC inapplicable to
section 310(b)(1), as this section regulated state activities; the statute in FERC was directed to how the states regulated private parties.7 Additionally, the majority opinion noted that such "commandeering" of state activities to comply with the federal mandate
was an inevitable by-product of regulating state activity72 because
federal regulation inherently involves state compliance. 73 Justice
Brennan remarked that if the states chose to enter the federal
realm, they must deal with the attendant regulations which results
in no constitutional deficiency. 74 Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that section 310 survived this second tenth amendment
75
challenge.
The majority opinion next addressed the second major issue of
whether section 310(b)(1) unconstitutionally violated the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity when the section imposed a
federal income tax on interest earned on a state bond. 76 South Carolina argued that a tax on the interest was contrary to Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company,77 which held that state bond
interest was exempt from federal taxation. 78 South Carolina's position forced the question of whether Pollock had to be explicitly
overruled. 79 Justice Brennan explained that Pollock followed the

69. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See infra notes 187-192 and accompanying text for a discussion of FERC.
70. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1361.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1362.
73. Id.
74. Id. For example, the Federal Labor Standards Act forced several states and municipalities to comply with the employment standards established by the Act. Id.
75. Id. Justice Brennan speculated on the consequences of following NGA's tenth
amendment "commandeering" theory. Id. Garcia would have to be overruled. Id. The limitations on congressional action involving the states would be more severe than under the
overruled National League of Cities v. Ursery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Id. Justice Brennan
stated that precedent demanded rejection of the NGA theory, Id.
76. Id.
77. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Pollock involved a federal two percent tax on a corporation's
income which, in part, came from municipal bonds. Id. at 431-33. The Court ruled the tax
unconstitutional as the income tax was a tax on the source, and thus, an impermissible
direct tax on a state. Id. at 586.
78. Id. "Under Pollock, a tax on the interest income derived from any state bond was
considered a direct tax on the state and thus unconstitutional." Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1362
(citing Pollock, 157 U.S. at 585-86).
79. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1363. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Special Master
contended that Pollock need not be overruled. Id. at 1362. They argued that § 310 was
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then existing general rule that no government could tax an individual on direct income earned from another government."s The rationale behind the rule was that taxing a party dealing with the
government taxed the contract, and thus, was "a tax 'on' the government because it burdened the government's power to enter into
the contract." ' Consequently, although the tax may fall on an independent private party, the Supreme Court, during the Pollock
era, concluded that the tax was "on" the government, and therefore unconstitutional, because the private party might transfer the
tax burden to the government via the contract.8 "
Justice Brennan observed that the rationale behind Pollock and
the general tax immunity on income from government contracts
had been completely repudiated by modern intergovernmental tax
immunity case law. 83 However, Justice Brennan found that Pollock
constitutional and Pollock still good law as § 310 did not absolutely eliminate tax-exempt
status for state bond interest, but conditioned tax exemption on the states issuing registered
bonds. Id.
80. Id. See generally Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S.
218 (1928); and Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
81. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1363. The reasoning of Pollock is from Weston, which exempted federal bond interest from state taxation. Weston, 27 U.S. at 468. "The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the [government's] power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and consequently to be
repugnant to the Constitution." Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586 (quoting Weston, 27 U.S. at 468).
82. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1364. This rationale helped establish the parameters within
which government contracts were immune from both federal and state taxes. Id. See infra
notes 236-240 and accompanying text for a discussion of Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931), which articulated the then current intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine by stating that any tax on a government was unconstitutional as the tax burdened the power of the government to function. Id. at 576-59.
83. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1365. For example, in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939), the Supreme Court declared that "[tihe theory. . . that a tax on income is
legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable." Id. at 480. In Graves, New
York had imposed an income tax on the salary of an employee of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, a federal corporation. Id. at 475-76. The Supreme Court declared that an income tax was no longer a tax on the governmental source and upheld the nondiscriminatory
tax, stating that "[tihe [tax] burden, so far as it can be said to exist or affect the government in any indirect or incidental way, is one which the Constitution presupposes .
Id.
at 487.
The Supreme Court thoroughly abandoned the burden on governmental contract theory
in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), when the Court upheld a state sales tax
imposed on a government contractor even though the cost of the tax was entirely passed on,
through a cost-plus contract, to the federal government. Id. at 12. The Court noted that the
contractor, a private party, not the federal government, paid the tax. Id. The Court completely foreclosed any claim that nondiscriminatory costs on private entities, which passed
them on to the state or federal government, burdened the government's functions, stating
that "[tihe asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immu-
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alone survived the changing intergovernmental tax immunity climate."4 The majority opinion explained that Congress had historically exempted state bond interest from federal taxation, and
therefore, there previously had been no need to explicitly overrule
85
Pollock.
Justice Brennan summarized the current state of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.8 6 He opined that a nondiscriminatory state or federal tax, collected from private parties contracting with another government entity, and thus not a direct tax,
is constitutional, even though that other government body may assume financial responsibility for the tax. 7 Justice Brennan noted
that the federal government, in spite of the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine, can impose some nondiscriminatory direct
taxes on the states.8 8 Therefore, under certain circumstances, the
federal government can directly tax the states, 89 but under no circumstances can the states directly tax the federal government.9 0
After completing the review of relevant cases and the current
status of the law, Justice Brennan confirmed that the Pollock holding, which prohibited the federal government from taxing state
bonds, was overruled. 9 1 The majority reasoned that the constitunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies
to the government and who have been granted no tax immunity." Id. at 9. See also Baker,
108 S. Ct. at 1365.
Subsequent case law continued the trend toward the taxation of private individuals who
conducted business with the government, see Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536,
549 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 734 (1982); United States v. County
of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460-62 n.9 (1977); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466,
469 (1958), and overruled most of the doctrines permitting government contract immunities.
See supra note 80.
84. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1366. The Court noted that the survivorship of tax free interest on state bonds was not related to any distinction between income from bonds and income from other government contracts. Id.
85. Id. See the Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 168, for the first federal
income statute exempting state bond interest from taxation.
86. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1366.
87. Id. See Washington, 460 U.S. at 540; County of Fresno, 429 U.S. at 460-463; City
of Detroit, 355 U.S. at 473; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 359-64
(1949); Graves, 306 U.S. at 485; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 38687 (1938). A direct tax on the federal government has been defined as a levy that is imposed
on the federal government or an agency or instrumentality intricately connected with the
government. See Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1366 (citing New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 735).
88. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1366. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), held
that the State of New York, which sold mineral water, was not immune from a federal excise
tax on the sale of soft drinks. Id. at 573-74, 584.
89. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1367 n.13. See supra note 88.
90. Id. See Graves, 306 U.S. at 477.
91. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1367. Pollock held that state bond interest was immune from a
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tion does not demand the separate tax treatment of persons who
receive interest on government bonds, compared with those who
earned other government income. 2 In addition, Justice Brennan
contended that the burden placed on the states by the federal tax
on the interest earned from bonds was indistinguishable from the
tax burden placed on any other state contract." State bondholders
lacked a constitutional exemption from a federal income tax on
their interest income,94 and the states were not constitutionally en95
titled to issue bonds with below-market interest rates.
The majority opinion found that section 310(b)(1) "clearly imposes no direct tax on the States."9 6 Justice Brennan reasoned that
bondholders, not the states, paid the tax, and any increased state
administrative costs due to the registration system were not
"taxes" as defined by the tax immunity doctrine. 7 Justice Brennan
also determined that section 310(b)(1) did not discriminate against
the states as all publicly offered long-term bonds had to be in registered form, regardless of whether offered by a local, state, or federal government or a private corporation. 8 Therefore, section
310(b)(1) passed the intergovernmental tax immunity test as the
tax was neither direct nor discriminatory. 9
The majority opinion held that section 310(b)(1) was constitunondiscriminatory federal tax. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586.
92. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1367. Justice Brennan, quoting Graves, stated that:
[T]he purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on the employees by relieving them from contributing their share of the financial support of the other government, whose benefits they enjoy, or to give an advantage to a government by enabling
it to engage employers at salaries lower than those paid for like services by other
employers, public or private ...
Id. (quoting Graves, 306 U.S. at 483).
93. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1367.
94. Id. See infra note 283 and accompanying text for a discussion of Memphis Bank &
Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983), which held that where the economic, but not the
legal, incidence of the tax is imposed upon the federal government, there is no constitutional
violation if the tax is not discriminatory. Id. at 397.
95. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1367.
96. Id. at 1368.
97. Id. United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931), defined a tax as "an enforced
contribution to provide for the support of the government." Id. at 572.
98. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368. Encouraging states to issue registered bonds, Justice
Brennan observed, was different from having corporations issue registered bonds because
only state bonds enjoyed immunity from federal income tax. Id. Yet, corporations would be
subject to "comparably severe" sanctions for issuing unregistered bonds. Id. If tax-exempt
status was denied to state bond interest, there would be no discrimination between state
and corporate bonds as both would be subject to federal taxation. Id.
99. Id.
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tional. 10 0 Justice Brennan found that federal imposition of a bond
registration requirement on the states does not contravene the
tenth amendment, 101 and a nondiscriminatory federal tax on the
interest earned on state bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.10 Therefore, the Supreme Court
overruled the exceptions to the Special Master's Report, and his
recommendation to enter judgment for the Secretary of the Treasury was approved.103
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion which recognized that
the majority's holding was clearly supported by Garcia.'0° Justice
Stevens pointed out, however, that the Court would have reached
the same result under the earlier decision of South Carolina v. Regan.10 5 Finally, the opinion emphasized that the Supreme Court
took no position on the wisdom of the federal government's decision to tax local and state government bonds. 06
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.10 7 Justice Scalia joined the Court's judgment, but disagreed
with the majority opinion's interpretation of FERC10 and Garcia. 10 9 Disputing the majority's description of Garcia'" as holding
that the "national political process" represented the states' only
constitutional shield from federal interference, and that "some extraordinary defect" must occur before the states could claim judi100. Id. at 1368-69.
101. See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
103. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 403-19 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
106. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369. Justice Stevens' opinion in Regan had already pointed
out the inadequacies of South Carolina's arguments. Regan, 465 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under § 310(b)(1), no federal tax was imposed on

South Carolina and the federal government was equally subject to the registration requirement. Id. at 414, 417. Justice Stevens believed that the burden on South Carolina was slight
and the federal interests were substantial. Id. at 416. The tenth amendment was not an
issue as article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution and the sixteenth amendment
gave Congress the power to tax private income. Id. at 418. Justice Stevens then stated that
even giving South Carolina's complaint a liberal reading, its position was without merit. Id.
at 403.
107. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369. Justice Scalia joined in the Court's judgment and opinion, except for Part II which analyzed the tenth amendment issue. Id.
108. Id. Justice Scalia agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that the majority opinion
unnecessarily questioned the continuing viability of FERC. Id. (referencing Baker, 108 S.
Ct. at 1370 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment)).
109. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369.
110. Id. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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cial relief,"' Justice Scalia emphasized that the Court in Garcia
had no need to articulate the boundaries which the constitution
places on federal regulation of the states.1 ' Justice Scalia concluded that Congress was within these boundaries in enacting section 310(b)(1)." '3
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. 1 " The Chief
Justice sided with the majority in its holding that section 310(b)(1)
of TEFRA does not violate intergovernmental tax immunity principles, but argued that the majority opinion carried the tenth
amendment analysis too far. 1 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
the Special Master's conclusion that section 310(b)(1) had a de
minimis impact on the states was well-supported and should have
ended the Court's consideration of the tenth amendment issue." '
The Chief Justice criticized the majority for going forth and addressing what possible failures of the national political process
might have influenced TEFRA, or how Garcia may have disregarded FERC's tenth amendment approach. 17' According to the
Chief Justice, the majority's expansive tenth amendment analysis
should have waited until this issue was clearly presented. 8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed with numerous aspects of the majority opinion. "' Justice O'Connor initially
considered the nearly one hundred year precedent of Pollock and
its constitutional immunity of federal taxation of state and municipal bond interest.2 0 She argued that the majority opinion's overruling of Pollock would, in part, place the states' revenue raising
ability under the control of the Congress and its decision whether
or not to tax interest from state bonds.'' Such congressional con111. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369. Justice Scalia quoted Garcia: "These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Id. (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556).
113. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1369.
114. Id. at 1370.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Chief Justice quoted from the Report of the Special Master. "TEFRA
has not changed how much the States borrow, for what purposes they borrow, how they
decide to borrow, or any other obviously important aspect of the borrowing process." Report
of Special Master at 118. The Master then reached the conclusion that the effect of §
310(b)(1)'s registration requirement on the states would be minimal. Id. at 132.
117. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1370.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1370-72.
120. Id. at 1370.
121. Id. See Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
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trol of the states would increase the states' dependence on the federal government. 122 Therefore, Justice O'Connor would not have
overruled Pollock, but would have struck down Congress'
attempt
123
to eliminate the tax immunity of state bond interest.
Whereas the majority opinion never directly discussed the constitutionality of federal taxation of state bond interest, 124 Justice
O'Connor declared outright that "the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution prohibit Congress
from taxing or threatening to tax the interest paid on state and
municipal bonds.' 12 2 5 Reproaching the majority for failing to examine the significant detrimental effects on the states if the federal
government were to tax state bond interest,1 26 Justice O'Connor
considered these negative effects. 127 The dissent recognized the important role long-term obligations play in state financial matters,'2 8
and concluded that "[i]f Congress may tax the interest paid on
state and local bonds, it may strike at the very heart of state and
12 9
local government activities.' 1
Justice O'Connor cited several cases where the Supreme Court
scrutinized the practical effects of its decisions in the intergovernmental tax immunity area. 130 The criteria for allowing an intergovernmental tax was that government operations not be substantially
affected.' 3 ' Citing Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corpora469 U.S. 528, 580-89 (1985)(O'Connor, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
There, Justice O'Connor emphasized the importance of state autonomy where the federal
government uses its enumerated powers. Id. at 581.
122. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1370.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1371.
125. Id. at 1370. Justice O'Connor also suggested that the Guarantee Clause of the
United States Constitution, article IV, section 4, prevented the federal government from
substantially violating the states' autonomy. Id.
126. Id. at 1371. Justice O'Connor again recalled her dissent in Garcia which stated
that the United States Supreme Court has an ongoing responsibility to make sure the federal government respects the states' domain. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581.
127. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1371.
128. Id. From 1974 to 1984, state bond issuances went from $23 billion to $102 billion.
Id. See supra note 6 for a greater discussion of the municipal bond market. These bonds
were used to finance education, road construction, utilities, and other public projects. Baker,
108 S. Ct. at 1371. The states' cost of capital would rise by one-third if their bonds were
subject to federal taxation. Id. The one-third increase comes from the 28-35% increase mentioned in note 54, supra, and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Justice O'Connor cited Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) and
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), as establishing the substantial effects
standard in evaluating intergovernmental tax. Id. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying

1989

Recent Decision

3
tion,1
1 Justice O'Connor noted that the Court demanded more
than theoretical concerns about infringing upon government functions, but that "substance and direct effects" would determine
whether intergovernmental tax immunity would be addressed.' 3 3
The Special Master's finding that a tax on state bond interest
would significantly increase the states' costs of borrowing lead Justice O'Connor to concluded that state operations would be seriously affected.""
Justice O'Connor then proceeded to criticize the majority's finding that there was no violation of intergovernmental tax immunity
in the case at bar.'3 5 In her opinion, the majority should have more
fully examined the pernicious effects of federal income taxation of
state and local bond interest.' 6 Justice O'Connor feared that subjecting bearer bonds to federal taxation would be just another step
37
in the stripping away of state sovereignty.'
Emphasizing that federal taxation of the states inherently challenges their sovereignty, 8' the dissenting opinion recalled that
Chief Justice Marshall had observed that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' 3 9 Justice O'Connor reminded the
majority that the constitution demands the protection of state autonomy and self-sufficiency by the tenth amendment and the guarantee clause, as well as in the inherent principles of federalism.' 0
The dissent then reproached the majority for failing in their duty

text for a discussion of Metcalf & Eddy. The reciprocal of Metcalf & Eddy was Dravo Con-

tracting Co., which upheld a state tax on a federal contractor. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U.S. at 161. See infra note 252 for a discussion of Dravo Contracting Co.

132. 303 U.S. 376 (1938). Mountain Producers Corp. overruled Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U.S. 501 (1922) and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). In Mountain Producers Corp., a federal income tax was imposed on the income a private corporation
received from an oil and gas lease from Wyoming. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. at
382-83. Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the opinion of the Court, declared that the substance and effect of the tax would determine its constitutionality. Id. at 386. The tax, to be
declared unconstitutional, had to have a substantial and direct effect upon governmental
functioning. Id. at 386. Chief Justice Hughes found the federal income tax had no direct and
substantial interference on the state and was therefore valid. Id. at 387.
133.

Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1371. See also Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. at 386.

134. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1371.
135. Id. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 1372.
137. Id. Justice O'Connor quoted Lawrence Tribe: "If there is any danger, it lies in the
tyranny of small decisions - in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." Id. (quoting
L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

381 (2d ed. 1988)).

138. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1372.
139. Id. The quote is from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
140. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1372.
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to uphold such safeguards."' Therefore, Justice O'Connor would
have declared section 310(b)(1) unconstitutional as violative of in2 the tenth amendment, and printergovernmental tax immunity,"
1 3
ciples of federalism.
The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. 14 4 The tenth amendment has been
read to establish a system of federalism composed of two separate
governments-a national government and numerous states, 4 5 with
the states possessing the powers necessary for a separate and independent existence.1 4 6 The states cannot be threatened by Congress
in a manner which violates either the states' integrity or their
47
place in the federal system.
An example of a violation of the sanctity of the states occurred
in Coyle v. Smith.'4" In Coyle, Congress conditioned Oklahoma's
admission into the Union upon Oklahoma agreeing to Congress' location of its capital.1 4 9 The issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Congress could constitutionally force Oklahoma to temporarily locate its capital at a place of Congress' choosing.' Congressional action involving the states, to be valid, had to be within the
regulatory powers of Congress.' 5' Congress had overstepped this
limitation in mandating the location of a state's capital because
where a state places its capital is "essentially and peculiarly" a
state prerogative which could not be expropriated.' 5 Therefore,
Congress had acted unconstitutionally and the Court ruled that
Oklahoma may decide where to locate its capital.'
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1370.
143. Id. at 1372.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
145. Report of Special Master at 94. The Report referenced Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700, 725 (1869), which declared both governments to be indestructible. Id.
146. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869). The Oregon Supreme
Court ruled that an Oregon statute required that state and local taxes be collected in gold
and silver coin. Id. at 72-73. Several acts of Congress provided that United States notes were
legal tender for debts. Id. at 71-72. The Supreme Court held the congressional acts had no
application to state taxes. Id. at 81.
147. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
148. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
149. Id. at 564.
150. Id. at 568.
151. Id. at 574.
152. Id. at 565.
153. Id. at 579-80.
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The states, however, are far from enjoying complete autonomy
from the federal government.' 5" The commerce clause has been the
central vehicle used by the federal government to regulate matters
within a state. 1 55 The commerce clause began its modern life in
1937 with National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation.56 There, Congress passed the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) which regulated labor disputes that arose in
interstate commerce.15 7 The constitutionality of the NLRA was upheld as the Court expanded the scope of the commerce clause to
permit the regulation of intrastate activities that affected interstate commerce. 1 58 The Court reasoned that if an intrastate activity was so closely tied to interstate commerce that control of the
intrastate activity was essential or appropriate to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress had the power
159
to regulate the intrastate activity.
In cases subsequent to Jones & Laughlin, the commerce clause
was also used to fix minimum wages and maximum hours of employees engaged in production of interstate commerce,11 ° and to in154. Report of Special Master at 93.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides: "The Congress shall have the Power: . . .
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." Id. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), established the extent of
the commerce clause. Aaron Ogden operated a steamboat line between New York and New
Jersey under an exclusive New York license. Id. at 1-2. Thomas Gibbons acquired a federal
license and began to compete against Ogden. Id. at 2. Ogden then obtained a New York
injunction that prevented Gibbons from operating in New York waters. Id. at 3. The United
States Supreme Court recognized the plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce by observing that "[t]his power [of the Commerce Clause], like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitation, other than those prescribed in the Constitution . . ." Id. at 196. The Court then
struck down the injunction as conflicting with the United States Constitution and a valid
federal law. Id. at 240.
156. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 37.
159. Id. at 37.
160. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Darby manufactured finished
lumber and shipped it out of state in violation of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Id. at 111. The FLSA established minimum wages
and maximum hours for employees producing interstate goods. Id. at 110. The FLSA prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods that violated its provisions and made
a federal crime the employing of workmen in the production of interstate goods at other
than the prescribed rates and hours. Id. at 109-10.
The Court upheld these two regulatory aspects of the FLSA. Id. at 125. In approving the
restrictions on interstate shipments, the Court found no usurpation of state power as the
power of Congress under the commerce clause is full constitutional authority which cannot
be increased or decreased by state action or non-action. Id. at 114. Congress is only limited
in its regulation of interstate commerce by specific constitutional prohibitions. Id. at 116.
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validate race discrimination by a local restaurant where the food
was supplied through interstate travel. 161 As long as the activity
has an interstate quality, although the activity is purely intrastate
in character, the activity may be regulated by Congress.162 These
cases served to redefine the nature of the tenth amendment.6 6 The
tenth amendment did not impose internal restrictions on Congress'
exercise of its delegated powers;"6 4 instead, "[t]he amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered." 65
The interpretation of the tenth amendment as a "truism" led to
the current state of affairs regarding the rights of the states under
the tenth amendment. 6 6 In Maryland v. Wirtz, 67 the Supreme
Court upheld the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) to state schools and hospitals.6 8 The Court reasoned that
The Court also ruled in favor of the criminal provision of FLSA. Id. at 125-26. Congress
"may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
though they involve control of intrastate activities." Id. at 121.
161. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Ollie's Barbecue, a Birmingham, Alabama restaurant, was located a distance from the interstate highway and train and
bus stations. Id. at 296. The restaurant provided sit-down service for whites and take-out
service for blacks. Id. During the previous year, forty-six percent of the food purchased by
the restaurant came from a local supplier who purchased it from out of state. Id.
Section 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited, in relevant part, discrimination by a restaurant if a substantial portion of the food has moved in interstate
commerce. Id. at 298. The Court upheld the Act as applied to Ollie's Barbecue. Id. at 30405. Acknowledging that Ollie's out of state purchase of food was small, in terms of interstate
commerce, the Court observed that similar conduct by many other restaurants would collectively have a significant effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 300-01. Thus, Congress' regulation of restaurants conducting business in interstate commerce similar to Ollie's Barbecue
was constitutional. Id. at 305.
162. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). It was the combining of "like
conduct by others similarly situated" that allowed Congress to regulate intrastate activities.
Id. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
163. Report of Special Master at 99-100.
164. Id. at 99.
165. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. The tenth amendment does not limit the express or implied powers delegated to the national government. Id.
166. Report of Special Master at 89-90.
167. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Justice Harlan wrote the six-justice majority opinion. Id. at
185. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Id. at 201. Justice Douglas maintained that the FLSA amendments upset the states' fiscal decisions and threatened their
independence in providing health and education services. Id. at 203. If such federal regulation of the states went unchecked, Justice Douglas warned that the states' sovereignty could
be crippled by the federal government. Id. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 201. Wirtz was overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
168. Wirtz, 329 U.S. at 186-87.
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the federal government, if within its powers, may dominate a countervailing State interest even though that interest is "governmental" or "proprietary."1 69 In addition, the regulation was nondiscriminatory as it applied to private and public employees. 17 0 The
Court then assured the states that the Court had the necessary
power to prevent "the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign
17 1
political entity.
In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to cover virtually all state
and local governments. 1 72 This expansion of the FLSA brought a
second tenth amendment case before the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery.'7 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court, examined whether the tenth amendment prevented
Congress from extending federal minimum-wage and overtime
rules to state and municipal employees. 7 7 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the tenth amendment limits Congress' power to regulate the states where "the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in the federal system" is impaired.17 5 In one part of
the opinion, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the substantial costs
by the states in complying with the federal regulations impaired
the states' ability to function effectively.176 More importantly, the
federal statute usurped the states' determination of what services
to provide to their citizens. 17 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress had unconstitutionally taken away from the
states their freedom "to structure integral operations in areas of
169. Id. at 195.
170. Id. at 194.
171. Id. at 196. The statement was a reference to the Court's power to strike down any
federal law that exceeded the constitutional structure. Id.
172. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 838-839 (1976). The 1974
Amendments expanded the definition of "employer" to cover "a public agency . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. IV 1970). "Public agency" included "a State, or a political subdivision of a State . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. IV 1970).
173. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833. National League of Cities was a 5 to
4 decision. Id. at 834. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion, agreed with the result,
but limited it to the statute involved. Id. at 856. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White
and Marshall, dissented. Id. Justice Brennan contended that the tenth amendment did not
limit Congress' exercise of its constitutional powers. Id. at 862. As the 1974 FLSA amendments were a valid exercise of the commerce power, Justice Brennan would have upheld the
federal statute. Id. at 880. Justice Stevens filed a second dissenting opinion. Id. The Justice
would have upheld the federal statue as he was unable to define where the federal government may not regulate state activity. Id. at 881. National League of Cities was overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
174. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836-37.
175. Id. at 842-84 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
176. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846.
177. Id. at 847.
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traditional governmental functions," and therefore, the Court
struck down the federal minimum-wage and overtime requirements as applied to the states.17 8 The National League of Cities
Court retreated from the Supreme Court's earlier broad interpretation of the tenth amendment which placed few restrictions on the
federal government's ample room to regulate the states.17 9 Instead,
the Court declared that the federal system limits the ability of
Congress to regulate the states using the commerce clause. 8 0
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association 8 ' took the holding of National League of Cities and developed a four part test to determine whether federal legislation exceeds its authority to regulate the states. 182 First, the statute has to
regulate the "States as States." 183 Second, the regulation has to involve "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." ' Third, the states' compliance with the federal law would have to directly impair the op8 5
eration of the states' "traditional governmental functions."'
Federal legislation that regulated the states would only be declared
invalid if these three requirements were met; yet, the federal interest may be so compelling that the state interest must be subverted
8
under the fourth prong of the Hodel test.1 6
In spite of National League of Cities' and Hodel's restrictions
on the federal government's regulation of the states, the Supreme
Court upheld another Act of Congress in FERC v. Mississippi.i"7
There, Mississippi brought a declaratory judgment action claiming
that certain provisions of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) exceeded Congress' power under the com178. Id. at 852.
179. Id. at 854-55. See also 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 4.10, at 162-66 (1986).
180. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842.
181. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). A federal statute, the Surface Mining Act, allowed the states
to implement federal surface coal mining regulations or concede the area to federal control.
Id. at 268-72. The Court considered whether the Act violated affirmative limitations of the
commerce clause. Id. at 268. As the statute only applied to private individuals and not the
states, the Court held the Act constitutional. Id. at 293, 305.
182. Id. at 287-88.
183. Id. at 287 (referencing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
184. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-288 (referencing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845).
185. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (referencing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
186. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548
(1975), reaffirmed in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53, and Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in that case. Id. at 856.
187. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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merce clause and the tenth amendment.18 8 PURPA required the
states to consider various federal proposals if the states wanted to
continue to regulate electric utilities.1 89 The Court recognized Congress' power to preempt the entire field of electric utility regulation due to the interstate nature of electric power. 19 0 The Court
observed that PURPA's allowing the states to consider the federal
proposals was less intrusive than preemption of the entire field.1 91
The Court therefore upheld PURPA in its entirety. 9 2
The Supreme Court took a one hundred and eighty degree turn
away from National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority 9 (SAMTA) by overruling National League of Cities and returning to the broader principles of
federalism. 94 SAMTA, a municipal mass-transit authority, sought
a declaratory judgment that it was exempt under the tenth amendment from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the
Federal Labor Standards Act. 95 The issue involved was whether,
under National League of Cities, SAMTA was performing "traditional governmental functions," and therefore was exempt from
FLSA. 9 6 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, found the determination of what was a "traditional government function" to be
problematic.197 This judicial approach also deprived the states of
the freedom to conduct their governments undisturbed within
their constitutional realm.19 8 Justice Blackmun declined to estab188. Id. at 752.
189. Id. at 746.
190. Id. at 755, 762.
191. Id. at 765.
192. Id. at 770-71.
193. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Blackmun wrote the five-person majority opinion. Id.
at 529. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
dissented. Id. at 557. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 579. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Powell, wrote another dissenting opinion
which expressed her views on federalism and the duty of the Court. Id. at 580. According to
Justice O'Connor, the core of federalism was that there were areas where the states may
exist independent of the federal government. Id. at 581. Further, Justice O'Connor stated
that the Supreme Court has a constitutional responsibility to insure that the federal government respects the "legitimate interests of the States." Id.
194. Report of Special Master at 111. In Garcia, the Court held that a public masstransit authority had to meet the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56.
195. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531, 534.
196. Id. at 537-38. The "traditional governmental functions" requirement was the
third part of the Hodel test involving Congress' authority to regulate the states. See supra
note 185 and accompanying text.
197. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
198. Id. at 547.
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lish the affirmative constitutional limits on Congress' regulation of
the states using the commerce clause, and instead chose to rely on
the political process to prevent passage of federal laws that would
be oppressive to the states. 199 However, the Court continued to recognize the special position the states occupy in the federal
system. e00
The seminal case in the area of intergovernmental tax immunity
was McCulloch v. Maryland.0 1 McCulloch was a federal tax immunity case which involved a Maryland stamp tax on bank notes
issued by the Baltimore Branch of the Bank of the United
States.20 2 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded
that the stamp tax was a tax on the operations of the bank which
was in turn a tax on the operations of an entity of the United
States Government. 20 3 In holding the tax unconstitutional, the
Chief Justice relied on the supremacy clause.2 0 1 "[T]he Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that
they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and
cannot be controlled by them. 20 5 Chief Justice Marshall determined that as the people of all the states, through the federal government, alone create the instrumentalities of the United States,
the people of the United States alone possess the power to tax
them. 20 6 Recognizing that the Bank of the United States was
brought into existence by the federal government, the Chief Justice concluded that the Bank could only be taxed by the federal
199. Id. at 556. Justice Blackmun wrote: "[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action -the built-in restraints
that our system provides through state participation in federal government action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated." Id.
The Court also quoted from Justice Black's concurring opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405 (1938). "The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of
constitutional action, the people-acting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives-have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 (citing Gerhardt,
304 U.S. at 427 (Black, J., concurring)).
200. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
201. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About
Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV.682, 701 (1976).
202. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317-19.
203. Id. at 436-37.
204. Id. at 426. The Court found no express clause in the constitution prohibiting the
tax but cited the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2. Id.
205. Id. The Court referred to the Supremacy Clause as the "great principle." Id.
206. Id. at 429.
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government and not by the states. 0°
Within a decade, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of
McCulloch to federal contracts. In Weston v. City Council of
Charleston,0 8 a private individual owned several United States obligations which were taxed by the City of Charleston.20 9 Even
though the tax was imposed upon a private individual, the Court
held that the federal tax immunity doctrine extended to purchasers of United States securities.2 1 0 The theory that evolved from
Weston was that any tax imposed upon income from a government
would likely be an impermissible attempt to tax the government
directly, regardless of the actual burden upon the government.2 1 1
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County" 2 completed the development of nineteenth century federal tax immunity cases. 1 3
Dobbins involved a county tax on the "office" of a federal revenue
cutter.2 1 ' At issue was whether the federal tax immunity doctrine
precluded the county tax on a federal official. 5 The Court determined that the tax on the "office" of captain was a tax on a means
used by the United States to govern, and was thus unconstitutional.21 6 The Supreme Court placed on the same federal tax immunity level not only taxes on income from the federal government, but also taxes on the "means" of the United States, with the
Therefore, the
result that both taxes were unconstitutional.2
Court declared unconstitutional the county tax on the "office" of a
federal revenue cutter.2 "
The converse of federal tax immunity, state tax immunity from
the federal government, was first addressed in Collector v. Day.21 9
207. Id. at 436.
208. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
209. Id. at 449-450.
210. Id. at 467.
211. Id. at 468. "The tax in question is a tax upon the contract subsisting between the
government and the individual. . . The power operates upon the contract the instant it is
framed, and must imply a right to affect that contract." Id. at 465.
212. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
213. Report of Special Master at 156.
214. Dobbins, 41 U.S. at 435. From 1835 to 1837, a captain of the United States revenue-cutter service was rated and assessed county taxes of $10.75 based on the value of his
office at $500. Id.
215. Id. at 444.
216. Id. at 449. The Court equated a tax on the income with a tax on the office, or
"means," of the United States. Id. at 448.
217. Id. at 449.
218. Id. at 450.
219. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). Collector was overruled by Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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There, the United States Government imposed a tax on the salary
of a Massachusetts probate and insolvency judge.2 2 ° The Supreme
Court decided to apply the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine equally to the states.22 ' Once again, the Court recognized that
nothing in the constitution expressly proscribed the taxing of one
government by another.2 22 However, the Court reasoned that intergovernmental tax immunity was implicit in the concept of a separate, independent government, and if the state was subjected to
taxation, the state would lose its viability and ultimately be dominated by the taxing government. 221 Therefore, the Collector Court
concluded that the federal government may not tax the salaries of
state government officials.2 24
The Collector decision provided the foundation for Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company.2 5 Pollock involved a federal
two percent tax on a corporation's income which, in part, came
from municipal bonds.2 26 Chief Justice Fuller, in delivering the
opinion of the Court, noted that the constitution recognizes the
independent spheres of the federal and the state governments. 2 7
The Chief Justice reasoned that taxing the interest on the municipal bonds would exert a "sensible" influence on the state's ability
220. Collector, 78 U.S. at 113-14.
221. Id. at 124. The Court used the federal tax immunity rationale of Dobbins to arrive at state tax immunity. Id. "[Ulpon the same construction of [the Constitution as in
Dobbins], and for like reasons, [the United States] is prohibited from taxing the salary of
the judicial officer of a state." Id.
222. Id. at 127. See supra note 201-207 and accompanying text for the earlier Supreme Court decision in McCulloch and that Court's discussion of the constitution and intergovernmental tax immunity.
223. Collector, 78 U.S. at 127. The Court reflected that the "great law of self-preservation" was at work here. Id.
224. Id. at 128.
225. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Chief Justice Fuller wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 553.
Justice Field wrote a concurring opinion in which he quoted Judge Cooley from The Principles of Constitutional Law, that "[tihe constitution contemplates no such shackles upon
state powers, and by implication forbids them." Id. at 601-02. Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 608. Justice Harlan authored a separate dissent. Id. at 652. While disagreeing with the majority on other points, both Justices agreed
with the majority that the state governments were immune from federal taxation. Id. at 651,
654.
226. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 430-32.
227. Id. at 583-84. "As the states cannot tax the powers, the operations, or the property of the United States, nor the means which they employ to carry their powers into
execution, so it has been held that the United States have no power under the Constitution
to tax either the instrumentalities or the property of a state." Id. at 584. The Court also
declared that a municipal corporation was a state instrumentality for the purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity. Id. Therefore, the revenues of municipal corporations were immune from federal income tax. Id.
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to borrow before the bonds were issued so that the state would, in
essence, be taxed by the federal government, in contravention of
the constitution. 228 Therefore, the Court invalidated the two percent federal tax.229
Pollock and other related decisions crystallized two principles
invalidating the federal tax on the income from state sources.3 0
The first was the "immunity of the source" principle, which reasoned that the income from certain types of state contracts, e.g.,
employment contracts, debt obligations, and leases, are intrinsically bound up with the states.2 3 ' Therefore, if the eventual source

of the individual's income was the state, then the income itself
must likewise be exempt from federal taxation.23 2
The second principle for invalidating the federal tax on state activity was the "intergovernmental burden" principle. 2 33 This prin-

ciple argued that a tax, although not imposed upon another government, would work itself back to the government and create a
burden on the government.23 ' If that burden had a "sensible influence" on the state government, the tax was unconstitutional.2 5
The Supreme Court, in Indian Motorcycle Company v. United
States,23a an intergovernmental tax burden case, articulated the

then existing intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.2 37 The
Court summarized that a tax on interest from any government
bond was unconstitutional as the tax would burden the government's power to borrow money.23 8 In addition, the Court found
228. Id. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 468 (1829).
229. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586.
230. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
113 (1871); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1931); and Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
231. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43 (referring to Collector, 78 U.S. at 122).
232. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43. See also Collector, 78 U.S. at 122-23,
127.
233. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43 (referring to South Carolina v. Regan,
465 U.S. 367, 406 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 400-01 (1931); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 222 (1928);
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1922); and Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530 (1916).
234. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43 (quoting Pollock, 157 U.S. at 585-586).
The burden would be in the form of increased costs from higher salaries or interest rates or
lower revenues. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 43.
235. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 585-86. See also Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. at 398.
236. 283 U.S. 570 (1931). The Court ruled against a federal tax on the sale of
motorcycles to a state agency. Id.
237. Id. at 575.
238. Id. at 576-77. Both "immunity of the source" and "intergovernmental burden"
principles were used to invalidate a tax on government interest. Id.
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that a tax on the salary of a government employee was unconstitutional because the tax would burden the government's power to
acquire the employee's services.2 39 Thus, the Supreme Court developed a form of absolute tax immunity, with state tax immunity
standing on an equal footing with federal tax immunity.4 0
The first crack in the tax immunity doctrine appeared in Met2 4 1 Stepping back from absolute tax immucalf & Eddy v. Mitchell.
nity, the Court distinguished between protected and unprotected
income. 24 The Court reasoned that income from activities where
the government was exercising their governmental powers was absolutely protected.2 43 As Metcalf involved a nondiscriminatory federal tax on a private individual, income from a state or local government was not immune from taxation.4
The Supreme Court later approved a federal tax on the capital
gains from the sale of municipal bonds. In Wilicuts v. Bunn,24 5 the
Court observed that the federal tax was neither discriminatory nor
direct and had a minimal effect on the local government.2 4 The
Court distinguished between a tax on capital gains and a tax on
interest.2 47 The differentiating factor was the fact that the interest
income arose from a contract between the government and an individual, while the government was not a party to a capital gains
transaction.2 48 The significance of Wilicuts was that the sale of
municipal bonds would no longer be considered to be "inseparably
connected" with municipal borrowing and could be taxed by the
federal government. 4 9
The Court continued moving away from complete intergovernmental tax immunity. 250 The Supreme Court upheld a federal tax
239. Id. at 577. "Intergovernmental burden" served as the reason for striking down a
tax on government employees. Id.
240. Id. at 575.
241. 269 U.S. 514 (1926). A federal income tax was imposed on the remuneration paid
to consulting engineers who did work for state and local governments. Id. at 518-19.
242. Id. at 522.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 524-25. The Court's reasoning was that: "In such a situation it cannot be
said that the tax is imposed upon an agency of government in any technical sense, and the
tax itself cannot be deemed to be an interference with government, or an impairment of the
efficiency of its agencies in any substantial way." Id.
245. 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
246. Id. at 225.
247. Id. at 227.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 229.
250. Report of Special Master at 168.
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on the profits of state lessees,25 1 and a state tax on the income of
federal contractors.2 52 The Supreme Court also ruled that a government may constitutionally tax the income of another government's employees. 253 Thus, the Court no longer considered either
the "immunity of the source" or the "intergovernmental burden"
principle a tenable standard for evaluating whether a governmental tax violated the constitution.5
With the discrediting of the "immunity of the source" and the
"intergovernmental burden" theories, recent cases have developed
two new tests for determining when the federal government is immune from a state tax. 5 The first criterion is whether "the levy
falls on the United States itself, or an agency or instrumentality so
closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities. ' " Second, the state tax must
not discriminate against those dealing with the federal govern257
ment, thereby unfairly burdening the federal government.
Therefore, if either one of these two tests is met, the state tax is
unconstitutional. 2 " State immunity from a federal tax is essentially on the same foundation as federal immunity from a state
tax.2 59 Therefore, the states are immune from federal taxation
where either the federal tax is imposed directly on the state or the
federal tax discriminates against the state. °
Proceeding to the reasoning behind the Court's decision in
South Carolina v. Baker, the Supreme Court used Garcia as its
251. See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). See supra note
132 for a discussion of Mountain Producers Corp.
252. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). In Dravo Contracting
Co., West Virginia taxed the gross receipts of an independent contractor doing business with
the federal government. Id. at 137. The issue was whether this nondiscriminatory state tax
was unconstitutional by burdening the federal government. Id. at 137. Justice Stone, in
writing for the Court, found that, as a practical matter, the state tax did "not interfere in
any substantial way with the performance of federal functions.
and upheld the tax. Id.
at 161.
253. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939). The Court
reasoned that the tax came from the employee's own cash and not from the government,
either directly or indirectly. Id. at 480.
254. Id. at 480, 487.
255. Brief for Secretary of the Treasury at 48.
256. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982).
257. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 (1977).
258. Brief of the Secretary of the Treasurer at 48-49.
259. Id. at 49. Federal tax immunity is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, whereas state tax immunity is founded on constitutional structure and
respect for state sovereignty. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 n.12 (1988).
Thus, federal tax immunity is broader than state tax immunity. Id.
260. Brief of the Secretary of the Treasury at 49.
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template in deciding the tenth amendment issue.2 6 ' Garcia established a structural/substantive distinction where the limits on Congress' power to regulate the states could be found in the workings
of the national political process, not in the judiciary.2 6 2 With this
analytical framework in place, Justice Brennan turned to South
Carolina's argument that the national political process had
failed.2 6
The Court analyzed South Carolina's explanation of why the national political process was deficient in Congress' enacting section
310(b)(1). 2 64 South Carolina charged that the deficiency was due to
the section being "imposed by the vote of an uninformed Congress
relying upon incomplete information."' 26 5 Justice Brennan deemed
this reason insufficient for the Court to delve into the workings of
the national political process. 266 The Supreme Court thus found no
tenth amendment violation here. 6 7
The second part of the tenth amendment issue was whether section 310(b)(1) "commandeered" the state legislative and administrative process because many state legislatures had to adopt the
section's registration requirement.2 68 The NGA argued that section
310(b)(1) was invalid because the states were forced to pass statutes and establish regulatory systems so that registered bonds
could be issued. 269 The Court noted that such "commandeering"
was an inevitable part of regulating state activity.2 7 0 Justice Brennan reasoned that if the states enter the federal realm, they must
necessarily deal with the attendant regulations which present no
constitutional infirmity. 27 1 Therefore, the Court upheld2 7the
consti2
tutionality of section 310 under the tenth amendment.
The Supreme Court next addressed the second issue of whether
section 310(b)(1) unconstitutionally violated the doctrine of inter261. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360.
262. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
263. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360.
264. Id. at 1361.
265. Brief for South Carolina at 101. South Carolina argued that Congress instead
relied on anecdotal evidence that bearer bonds were used to conceal income. Id. at 102-03.
266. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1361. The Court could not find any basis for allowing courts
to "second-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation." Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Brief for the NGA at 23.
270. Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1361-62. Justice Brennan noted that federal regulation inherently involves state compliance. Id. at 1362.
271. Id. at 1362.
272. Id.
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governmental tax immunity by taxing the interest from state
bonds.27 3 South Carolina contended that section 310(b)(1) was inconsistent with Pollock. 4 While both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Special Master chose not to directly challenge Pollock, the Court found their reasoning for not avoiding Pollock
specious.1 ' Therefore, the Supreme Court directly considered
whether Pollock should be overruled.27 6
The reason Pollock was never explicitly overruled, Justice Brennan noted, was that state bond interest had been tax-exempt since
the first federal income tax statute.2 77 Reciting a litany of modern
intergovernmental tax immunity cases that conflicted with Pollock,2 the Court then stated that the holding in Pollock was no
longer viable.2 79 Justice Brennan reasoned that the interest income
from government bonds was not to be treated differently from
other interest income. 28 0 Furthermore, the costs on the states, because of a tax on the interest, was no different from other costs
imposed on the states from other contracts.2 8 1 The constitution
does not exempt bondholders from paying tax on their interest income from state bonds and does not guarantee to the states a
lower interest rate on their bonds.2 8 The Court recalled that a
273. Id.
274. Id. Pollock held that a federal tax on state bond interest was an unconstitutional
direct tax. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 485-86 (1895).
275. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1362. Justice Brennan declared that making a tax conditional
did not guarantee its constitutionality. Id. Congress' attempt to only tax state bonds not in
registered form would "employ unconstitutional means to reach a constitutional end." Id.
Justice Brennan gave as an example the situation where Congress imposed a direct, exclusive tax on South Carolina. Id. at 1362. Under this scenario, South Carolina could only
escape taxation if it altered its government to comply with congressional dictates. Id. In
spite of the escape mechanism for South Carolina, Justice Brennan nevertheless concluded
that the Supreme Court would be compelled to examine the constitutionality of the federal
statute. Id.
276. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1363.
277. Id. at 1366. See also Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 168.
278. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1366. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466
(1939); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U.S. 134 (1937); and note 83 supra for other modern cases that conflicted with Pollock.
279. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1367.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. Justice Brennan analogized the taxation of the interest from state bonds to
the taxation of the salaries of government employees. Id.
[A]s applied to the taxation of salaries of the employees of one government, the purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on the employees by relieving them
from contributing their share of the financial support of the other government, whose
benefits they enjoy, or to give an advantage to a government by enabling it to engage
employees at salaries lower than those paid for like services by other employers, pub-
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holder of a United States bond could be constitutionally taxed on
the interest by the states.283
The Court then applied the present intergovernmental tax immunity test to section 310(b)(1) 284 The first requirement was that
the tax not be a direct tax.2 85 Justice Brennan determined that this
requirement was met because the federal tax on the bonds was assessed against the owners of the bonds and not the states. s In
addition, if the states experienced additional costs to comply with
the registration requirements of section 310(b)(1), such costs were
not taxes as defined under the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine. 87
Justice Brennan found that the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine's second requirement, that the tax not discriminate
against the states, was also fulfilled under section 310(b)(1).

288

The

aim of section 310 was to have all publicly offered long-term bonds
issued in registered form. 289 The Court noted that both private cor-

porations and the federal government, in addition to the state,
lic or private ...
Id. (quoting Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939)).
283. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 396 (1983). However, the tax
in Memphis Bank & Trust Co. was ruled unconstitutional as the tax discriminated against
the federal government. Id. at 399. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. brought an action in state
court to recover taxes paid under the Tennessee bank tax. Id. at 393. The tax was imposed
on banks doing business in Tennessee based on their net earnings, which included interest
earned on obligations of the United States and of states other than Tennessee, but not
interest earned on obligations of Tennessee or its subdivisions. Id. The Supreme Court considered whether the Tennessee bank tax violated federal immunity from state tax. Id. The
Court stated that a state tax that placed a greater burden on federal property holders than
similar state property holders was unconstitutionally discriminatory. Id. at 397. As the Tennessee bank tax was discriminatory in that it included federal obligations but not Tennessee
obligations in its tax base, the Court declared the Tennessee bank tax unconstitutional. Id.
at 398-99.
284. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
285. Id. See also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982).
286. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368. In addition, the Special Master emphasized that the

Supreme Court has never held that the compliance costs associated with federal statutes
were a direct tax. The Special Master listed as examples EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983), and FERC, both of which held that the compliance costs imposed by federal laws
were not direct taxes. Report of Special Master at 185.
287. Baker, 168 S. Ct. at 1368. United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S.
599, 606 (1975), defined a tax as "an enforced contribution to provide support for the government." Id. (quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).
288. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368. See also United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S.
452, 462 (1977).
289. Chairman Rostenkowski of the House Ways and Means Committee added the
registration requirement for all long-term bonds in H.R. 6300. See H.R. 6300 §§ 102(a),
102(b)(1), 102(b)(2), and 102(b)(3).
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were equally subject to this rule.2 90 Section 310(a) states that the
United States must issue bonds of one year or greater in registered
form.2 91 Thus, the Court reasoned that both the United States and
the states are subject to the same registration requirement.2 92 In
addition, private corporations are subject to sanctions for failing to
comply with other registration provisions in section 310.293 Finally,
the Supreme Court noted that section 310(b)(1) only disallows taxexempt status to unregistered state bonds.29 4 Therefore, while the
penalties imposed on private corporations and the states are different, the Court concluded that the penalties are of comparable severity, that there is no discrimination, and that the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is not violated by section 310(b)(1)
of TEFRA. 95
Justice O'Connor, in writing the dissenting opinion, argued that
the practical effects of federal taxation of state bond interest had
to be considered by the Supreme Court, something the majority
opinion declined to do.2 96 According to Justice O'Connor, an intergovernmental tax could not substantially affect government operations.29 7 State bonds generated important and significant revenues
for state governments.29 The Special Master had found that a tax
on state bond interest would significantly increase the states' costs
of borrowing. 299 These facts brought Justice O'Connor to the conclusion that a federal tax on state bond interest would seriously
affect state operations.3 0 0 Therefore, Justice O'Connor would have
denied Congress the power to eliminate the tax immunity of state
bond interest by declaring section 310(b)(1) unconstitutional on intergovernmental tax immunity grounds.0
Justice O'Connor next examined the issue of state sovereignty
290. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368. In addition, § 310 regulated unregistered bond holders
who were denied their loss and capital gain deductions. See TEFRA § 310(b)(5)-(b)(6).
291. TEFRA § 310(a).
292. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368.
293. TEFRA §§ 310(b)(2)-(b)(6). These sanctions were that corporations would lose
their federal interest deduction, their ability to adjust earnings and profits, and would have
to pay an excise tax on "registered required obligations not in registered form." Id. at §§
310(b)(2)-(b)(4).
294. Id. at § 310(b)(1).
295. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1368.
296. Id. at 1371.
297. Id.
298. Id. See supra note 128.
299. Report of Special Master at 3.
300. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1371.
301. Id. at 1370.
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and section 310(b)(1).302 The constitution, Justice O'Connor asserted, guarantees state independence by the tenth amendment
and principles of federalism.30 3 Taxation of interest on state bonds
is a threat to state sovereignty, and Justice O'Connor admonished
the majority for not eliminating this threat. 4 Consequently, Justice O'Connor stated that section 310(b)(1) also could not survive
the tenth amendment and principles of federalism.3 05
The United States Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Baker
held that section 310(b)(1) of TEFRA violated neither the tenth
amendment nor the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. 06
In upholding the potential federal taxation of interest from state
and municipal bonds, the Court took the final step in eroding the
barriers in the taxation of income derived from a government. In
the future, a tax on government income will pass the intergovernmental tax immunity standard as long as the tax is not directly
imposed on the government and does not discriminate against the
government. Any statute enacting a tax on income from a government source will also survive a tenth amendment challenge, unless
there is a gross defect in the legislative process. In the current judicial atmosphere, to contest these taxes would be futile and a waste
of judicial resources.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in South Carolina v.
Baker was the one opinion that realized the full and true impact of
section 310(b)(1) of TEFRA on the states. 0 In the area of intergovernmental tax immunity, only Justice O'Connor properly fo30 8
cused on the practical effects on the states of section 310(b)(1).
The state and local governments' ability to borrow money would
be seriously affected if the federal government were allowed to tax
state bond interest. 9 Further, state borrowings constitute an im302. Id. at 1372.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1368-69.
307. In addition to the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion,
three other opinions were filed. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. See supra notes
104-106 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia joined the Court's judgment, but disagreed
with the majority opinion's interpretation of FERC and Garcia. See supra notes 107-113
and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. See supra
notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
308. Id. at 1371.
309. See supra note 37 for a discussion of the costs associated with issuing registered
state bonds.

1989

Recent Decision

389

portant part of their sovereign right to govern. 1 0 Section 310(b)(1)
cuts, and cuts deeply, into this legitimate interest of the states.
Therefore, Pollock should not have been overruled and section
310(b)(1) should have been found to have violated intergovernmental tax immunity.
The majority opinion tightened the federal noose around the
states' necks. By permitting the federal government to tax the interest on unregistered state and municipal bonds, the Court effectively compelled the states to comply with the federal government's demands regarding the registration of long-term bonds. No
other conclusion can be reached except that the states, with the
enactment of section 310(b)(1), became further subordinated to
the will of the federal government. This subjugation of the states
by the federal government mocks the tenth amendment and principles of federalism. Consequently, section 310(b)(1) should have
also been declared unconstitutional.
Michael J. Sluss

310.

See supra note 6 for a discussion of the uses of state borrowings.

